question, accordingly, that we now turn. 205 N.L.R.B. Nevertheless, we agree that the rule suggested by amicus, although having its genesis in the constitutional issues raised in Lloyd, isolates the factors relevant to determining when private property rights of a shopping center owner should be required to yield to the section 7 rights of labor picketers." v. JEWS FOR JESUS, INC., et al., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), ARKANSAS WRITERS’ PROJECT, INC. v. RAGLAND, COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE OF ARKANSAS, 481 U.S. 221 (1987), CITY OF RENTON et al. This difference is "one of substance." 1187, 1216-1219 (1973). 718, 721, 94 L.Ed. ", "The argument reaches too far. 351 U.S., at 112, 76 S.Ct., at 684. [Footnote 10] The context of the § 7, activity in the present case was different in several respects which may or may not be relevant in striking the proper balance. The question presented is whether this threat violated the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465, 70 S.Ct. 424 U. S. 512-521. Hence, the case is remanded so that the NLRB may reconsider the case under the NLRA's statutory criteria alone. Accommodation between employees' § 7 rights and employers' property rights, the Court said in Babcock & Wilcox, "must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." v. LOUISIANA, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), EDWARDS et al. First and Fourteenth Amendment free-speech rights were deemed infringed under the facts of that case when the property owner invoked the trespass laws of the State against the pickets. in emphasis from much of the language of Logan Valley. But the fact remains that Logan Valley explicitly reserved the question later decided in Lloyd, and Lloyd carefully preserved the holding of Logan Valley. The Court's opinion pointed out that the First and Fourteenth Amendments would clearly have protected the picketing if it had taken place on a public sidewalk: "It is clear that, if the shopping center premises were not privately owned, but instead constituted the business area of a municipality, which they to a large extent resemble, petitioners could not be barred from exercising their First Amendment rights there on the sole ground that title to the property was in the municipality. A deputy of the Mobile County Sheriff, paid by the company, serves as the town's policeman. altogether such use of some of its facilities, what a municipality may But the fact remains that Logan Valley explicitly reserved the question later decided in Lloyd, and Lloyd carefully preserved the holding of Logan Valley. Lloyd and Central Hardware demonstrated, each in its own way, that Logan Valley could not be read as broadly as some Courts of Appeals had read it. a wholly nonunion staff. Not only employees with a labor dispute, but also consumers with complaints against business establishments, may look to the location of a retail store as the only reasonable avenue for effective communication with the public. I can find very little resemblance between the shopping center involved in this case and Chickasaw, Alabama.". On its face, Logan Valley does not cover the facts of this case. And, in the performance of that duty, we make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in the Lloyd case. It seems to me that this clarification of the law is desirable. Not only employees with a labor dispute, but also consumers or state. 501 F.2d 161. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assn. The shopping center houses 60 retail stores leased to various businesses. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." by FIRE March 3, 1976 . The Court’s opinion then reviewed the Marsh case in detail, emphasized the similarities between the business *516 block in Chickasaw, Ala., and the Logan Valley shopping center, and unambiguously concluded: “The shopping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the business district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh.” 391 U. S., at 318. Lloyd retained the availability of First Amendment protection when the picketing is related to the function of the shopping center, and when there is no other reasonable opportunity to convey the message to the intended audience. It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue to believe 1187, 1216-1219 (1973). Discussion. In Babcock & Wilcox itself, the intended audience was the employees of a particular employer, a limited identifiable group; and it was thought that such an audience could be reached effectively by means other than entrance onto the employer’s property—for example, personal contact at the employees’ living quarters, which were “in reasonable reach.” Id., at 113.